Between 2012 and 2018, assets of state companies grew at more than 15 percent annually, well over twice the pace of expansion of China’s GDP and double the pace of growth of gross domestic capital formation. For most of this period the return on assets of state companies was declining, so retained earnings to finance additional investment were weak.
State firms, at least through 2018, have continued to enjoy preferred access to bank loans as well as to the domestic corporate bond market. Indeed, the growth of liabilities of state companies matched the growth of assets so that the ratio of liabilities to assets in 2018 was relatively high at 0.64, the same as in 2012.
Absent such central bank data after 2016, an alternative is to look at the growth of assets of state-owned nonfinancial firms. China’s State Council just released data for 2018, revealing that the assets of these firms at year-end stood at RMB210.4 trillion, equivalent to more than 230 percent of China’s GDP.
Sure enough, the growth of assets of state firms was relatively modest through 2012, when most bank credit was flowing to private firms. Since then, however, the tide has turned in favor of state firms.
Unfortunately, the People’s Bank of China has discontinued publishing the data that would demonstrate whether the policy of redirecting credit to state firms persists or has been modified. Other government agencies have also recently stopped publishing a variety of statistical series that have long been useful in analyzing the Chinese economy.
石头127
陆老师，我问一个低级的问题，为什么利率压低，为什么贷款的供给会抵不上贷款需求的增加呢
陆铭 回复 @石头127：
相对于均衡利率，可以使供给等于需求，压低利率就是需求大于供给。
石头127 回复 @石头127：
您开头所说的利率低是钱多的情况，并不是贷款的供给变多了是吧
柳林冒肥肠
老师，每一讲最后的key takeaway建议分1、2、3点列出
陆铭 回复 @柳林冒肥肠：
谢谢意见
Will_Gardner
Between 2012 and 2018, assets of state companies grew at more than 15 percent annually, well over twice the pace of expansion of China’s GDP and double the pace of growth of gross domestic capital formation. For most of this period the return on assets of state companies was declining, so retained earnings to finance additional investment were weak.
Will_Gardner 回复 @Will_Gardner：
State firms, at least through 2018, have continued to enjoy preferred access to bank loans as well as to the domestic corporate bond market. Indeed, the growth of liabilities of state companies matched the growth of assets so that the ratio of liabilities to assets in 2018 was relatively high at 0.64, the same as in 2012.
Will_Gardner
Absent such central bank data after 2016, an alternative is to look at the growth of assets of state-owned nonfinancial firms. China’s State Council just released data for 2018, revealing that the assets of these firms at year-end stood at RMB210.4 trillion, equivalent to more than 230 percent of China’s GDP.
Will_Gardner 回复 @Will_Gardner：
Sure enough, the growth of assets of state firms was relatively modest through 2012, when most bank credit was flowing to private firms. Since then, however, the tide has turned in favor of state firms.
Will_Gardner
Unfortunately, the People’s Bank of China has discontinued publishing the data that would demonstrate whether the policy of redirecting credit to state firms persists or has been modified. Other government agencies have also recently stopped publishing a variety of statistical series that have long been useful in analyzing the Chinese economy.
Will_Gardner 回复 @Will_Gardner：
Whether this data suppression is because the authorities wish to hide information on sensitive economic developments or something else is not clear.